In popular understanding, the University of Chicago monetary tradition is inextricably linked to the ideas of Milton Friedman, which extend well beyond that area to encompass a general belief in the efficacy of market mechanisms as regulators of economic life, and an equally general skepticism about the desirability of government intervention therein (Reder 1987) . Chicago "monetarism" is seen as having challenged (more or less successfully, depending on the commentator) a previously dominant "Keynesian" consensus on these matters. Though Chicago monetary economics can, and should, be judged on its theoretical and empirical merits, I shall also pay some attention to its broader political connections in this essay, because such considerations are important in locating its position in the broader history of American economic thought..
The First Chicago Tradition
The history of Chicago monetary economics long antedates the outbreak of the monetarist controversy of the 1950s. The first chairman of the Chicago economics department, James Laurence Laughlin, was one of America's most influential monetary economists between the 1880s and the foundation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. (Friedman 1987 , Dimand 2002 . Along with his student Henry Parker Willis, eventually a professor at Columbia Business School, he continued to expound his ideas in the debates about monetary policy of the 1920s and 1930s, though. another important student, Wesley Clair Mitchell, had by then largely broken free of his influence.
Laughlin was conservative in both his politics and his economics throughout his long life, as his writings (eg.1885, 1903, 1933) attest. He was a staunch defender of the gold standard during the debates about bimetallism, and his close association with the Republican Party, forged during that debate, prevented him playing a direct role in the creation of the Federal Reserve system, though he exerted considerable indirect influence on that process, both through the force of his ideas, and through Willis who played a direct role as counsel to Congressman Carter because, in the monetary area, and in the first of several strokes of irony that mark that tradition's development, he was a leading opponent of the Quantity Theory of Money. Long after marginalist ideas permeated micro-economics Laughlin remained a devotee of the classical costof-production theory of value, and of the related idea that gold was the "natural" standard of value. These ideas led him to treat price level variations under the gold standard as originating in changes in the cost of production of individual goods. They also led him to oppose proposals for countering the deflation that marked the period 1873-1896 by monetary expansion based on reintroducing silver into the monetary system, and hence restoring bimetallism to the US monetary system. For Laughlin, the latter ideas, which were supported by the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, and notably by William Jennings Bryan, were ill-conceived and dangerous. (Laidler 2001) There was indeed a strong inflationist element among the bimetallists, but Laughlin rejected not just that, but the quantity theory of money upon which even responsible bimetallists, such as Francis Walker, (ironically) of MIT, based their case. He and his fellow defenders of gold monometallism were so successful in discrediting the quantity theory in popular thought that Irving Fisher's 1911 Purchasing Power of Money was written explicitly to re-instate it as a scientifically respectable doctrine, and is best read as a rebuttal of Laughlin's ideas.
When it came to banking, Laughlin expounded a version of what Lloyd Mints (1945) , a contributor to the inter-war Chicago tradition to be discussed below, would later call the "real bills doctrine". Laughlin took over from the mid-19th century British "Banking School" the view that the banking system should grant short term credit in sufficient amounts to meet the "needs of trade", which were themselves conditioned by real factors. This goal would be best accomplished by a banking system configured to provide an "elastic currency". Neither Laughlin (nor the Banking School before him) made a careful and consistent distinction between money 4 and credit, but in practice their prescription was that a banking system should confine itself to providing short term loans to finance inventories and goods in process in whatever amounts were demanded, and they were sometimes unfortunately vague about the role of the rate of interest in conditioning that demand. Such behaviour, they believed, would make the banking system a passive agent in an economy that could otherwise be trusted to run smoothly, and prevent it from contributing to monetary instability.
These views, which were also held by Willis, had a considerable influence both on the design of the Federal Reserve system, and on its policies in the 1920s and early 1930s, when, it is now widely agreed, the Fed's passivity permitted an ordinary cyclical downturn to get out of hand and develop into what Friedman and Schwartz (1963) would call the Great Contraction.
Laughlin and Willis were prominent among those who took a fatalistic attitude towards the economy's collapse in the early 1930s, defended the Fed's passive stance, and opposed any policies actively designed to promote recovery. By that time, however, such ideas were no longer represented among active members of the Chicago department.
The Inter-war Chicago Tradition
No proposition is more closely associated with Friedman's monetary economics than that the Federal Reserve system was largely responsible for the severity of the Great Contraction, and Lloyd Mints had developed a version of this argument as early as (1948) . The contrast between early Chicago monetary economics as represented by Laughlin, and Friedman's version could, therefore, hardly be starker. Friedman argued (1956 Friedman argued ( , 1974 , that even in the early 1930s, (Mehrling, 1998) . These middle ground ideas were heavily influenced by the British economists Ralph Hawtrey (eg. 1919) Evidently, then, monetary economics at Chicago was anything but scientifically or politically homogeneous during the Great Contraction, but the economic problems of the time meant that economists with very different understandings of how the economy functioned, and of very different political persuasions too, could sometimes agree about policy, and so it was at Chicago for a while. In the early 1930s it was natural for an under-consumptionist of Douglas's stripe to support with renewed vigour the continuous fiscal and monetary expansion that he had been recommending even during the boom of the 1920s. And it was equally natural for a quantity theorist such as Viner (1932 Viner ( ,1933 to deplore the influence of the real bills doctrine on Fed. Policy and to join Simons and others among his colleagues in supporting immediate monetary expansion as a palliative for the contraction, though Viner was troubled that such policies might require the US to abandon the gold standard, of which he was a supporter.
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As banking problems in the United States became more and more acute in 1932-33, it was also natural to look for ways of ensuring that monetary expansion could in fact be engineered. and, it is not surprising that "fiscal inflationism", the use of money financed budget deficits to bring about monetary expansion, should find support from a group that had Douglas at one theoretical and political extreme and Simons at the other, and included Viner for a while too.
Nor was it surprising that a proposal for backing demand deposits with a 100 per cent reserve requirement in order to give the authorities firm control over the behaviour of the money supply, and to prevent any future collapses of the market for bank credit generating monetary contractions, -the central feature of A. G. Hart (1935) would term the "Chicago Plan for
Banking Reform" -would also emerge from and find support among this diverse group. Reeve (1943 ), Humphrey (1971 ), Phillips (1995 , and Laidler, (1999, Chs. 8 and 9) . Such ideas are to be found independently and more or less fully articulated in the writings of a number of non-Chicagoans in the early 1930s, in some cases before they appear in Chicago sources. This is not to deny that such ideas were discussed and promoted at Chicago. Over and The picture that emerges from all this is not of Chicago as a unique institution where ideas that had difficulty maintaining more than a foothold elsewhere were developed and promoted during the 1930s, but rather as a department that was one important and vigorous participant in a much more widespread tradition in monetary economics, many (but not all) of whose adherents deployed the quantity theory of money in a critique of economic policies based on the real bills doctrine, and in proposals to supplant those policies with vigorous monetary and fiscal expansion.
To the extent that Chicago made a unique contribution to this tradition, it was the approach to economic policy that we associate with the writings of Henry Simons, but to which Positive Economics", which defended empirical relevance of the theory of the profit-maximising firm, and particularly its perfectly competitive version, on the basis of its capacity to make useful predictions (an approach influenced by contacts made with Karl Popper through the Mont Pelerin Society -see Friedman and Friedman, 1999) and his (1956) "The Quantity Theory of Money -a Restatement" that established him as a critic of the then dominant economic orthodoxy that American economics had inherited from the late 1930s. This orthodoxy viewed the economy as dominated by large firms, whose administered prices had more to do with the exercise of monopoly power than the efficient allocation of resources, and hence fit objects for regulation, and it put its faith in fiscal rather than monetary tools for activist macro-stabilisation, Friedman "restated" the quantity theory as a theory of the demand for money that bore a strong resemblance to Keynes's (1936) version of liquidity preference theory, albeit without the "liquidity trap", which was then a prominent feature of textbook expositions of the latter, but that hardly made his work "Keynesian". Keynes's theory had roots of its own in the work of Marshall, Pigou and Lavington, who had developed a version of the quantity theory based on the interaction of the stock supply and demand for money (in contrast to Fisher's more traditional money times velocity flow approach), and this approach had also influenced the middle ground of American monetary economics discussed earlier, where much earlier Chicago work had been located . Even though, before Friedman, the quantity theory had been understood to deal with the influence of the quantity of money on prices and not just the demand for money, it is a necessary condition for such influence to be systematic and predictable that the demand for money be a stable function of but a few arguments, and this was the central proposition of his essay.
Furthermore, empirical studies of the influence of money on inflation played a central role in the work of his colleagues and students (in addition to Friedman 1956 , see also, for example, Meiselman (ed.) 1970), so, overall, Friedman was surely right to claim a place for his work in a quantity theory based tradition..
The claim that a particular macroeconomic relationship was both simple and empirically stable, was not new in 1956. Keynes had made it on behalf of the consumption function twenty years earlier, and by the 1950s, a stable marginal propensity to save out of current income, and hence a stable multiplier, was seen as the sine qua non for successful fiscal policy. Friedman's 1957 Theory of the Consumption Function, (for which he received his Nobel Prize) showed that the, by then numerous and well known, anomalies in observed income consumption relationships could be resolved by postulating that consumption (of non-durable goods) was a stable function of permanent income, so that saving would be an unstable sum of the fraction of permanent income saved and transitory fluctuations around it. Thus, Friedman's work of the 1950s replaced a supposedly empirically stable savings function with a stable demand for money function, thereby undermining conventional policy wisdom which emphasised the efficacy of fiscal rather than monetary tools. And to this he added a keen appreciation of the possibility that policy in general, but monetary policy in particular, worked with long and variable time lags, that made its use for active stabilisation purposes problematic. By (1959), then, Friedman was suggesting that monetary policy be used to create a background of macroeconomic stability by being tied down to a constant rate of growth for the money supply, and suggesting that, in such a regime, there was no place for stabilisation by fiscal means. Small wonder that he recognised the relationship between his views and those espoused by Henry Simons two decades earlier, (though Simons (1936) had favoured a price stability rule) and small wonder too that, with the links between his policy proposals and a conservative political agenda being so evident, his work was greeted with skepticism and sometime outright ridicule in more orthodox circles.
But, it is important to note, Friedman's policy conclusions followed from well specified economic theory. And he soon extended the latter by showing (1968) that then widely held beliefs, that inflation and unemployment varied inversely with each other along a Phillips curve that might be exploited by policy makers, rested on the hidden postulate that economic agents suffered from permanent money illusion. Friedman also developed a considerable body of empirical evidence, not least that presented in Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) Monetary History of the United States, that argued for an essentially monetary explanation of the cycle in general and the Great Contraction of 1929-33 in particular. In the latter case, his arguments followed lines that a number of middle ground American economists of the early 1930s had adopted at the time. Politically unpalatable or not, then, the economics profession in due course had to take Friedman's views seriously. Because they involved economics that had political implications, rather than economics distorted by preconceived ideology, they invited theoretical and empirical criticism, and ultimately received it, in the course of the so-called "monetarist controversy". Moreover, Friedman was anything but a lone wolf in his own university. His theoretical and policy ideas were buttressed by a series of empirical studies, mainly carried out by students, many of whom would in due course go on to make considerable reputations of their own. It was also at about this time, specifically in 1960, that the formidable Harry Johnson was appointed to Chicago as a "Keynesian" counterweight to Friedman, and undertook the task of ensuring that students were exposed to the whole literature of monetary economics, and not just Chicago's contribution to it.
But, when all is said and done, the Chicago monetary tradition of the late1960s was more homogeneous, more distinctive, and more the product of the ideas and energy of one man than anything that had been seen in the inter-war years. And yet at that time it was also a tradition in search of an important policy problem (Johnson 1971 Government in the United Kingdom, though here, it should be noted that the first efforts to bring inflation down by way of monetary contraction started, albeit tentatively, in both countries before the accession of either to office. But it was under them that a monetary cure for inflation was vigorously applied, alongside a more general shift to laissez-faire economic policies. As a result, the political association between the Chicago monetary tradition and conservative politics, which had already received an unfortunate boost in Chile where, under the Pinochet regime, such policies had already become associated with military dictatorship, became firmly cemented in public perceptions.
After Monetarism
There is not space here to discuss why the quantity theory of money, which had been associated with progressive politics when the University of Chicago was founded, had migrated to the right by the late 1970s. (See Laidler 2001) . It is, however, important to the story of monetary economics at that University to note that problems with definition and measurement of money, long the Achilles heel of that doctrine, reasserted their significance with a vengeance at that time. Financial innovations, some but not all of which were themselves responses to inflation, 14 began to undermine the empirical stability of the demand for money function. On the policy front, this contributed to the difficulties that central banks encountered in ensuring a smooth end to inflation, and within academic monetary economics it contributed to an intellectual vacuum which was soon to be filled, not least at the University of Chicago, by New-classical economics. Tobin's (1981) It is too early to assess the place of New classical economics in the history of monetary economics. In its earliest form, which had the Lucas (eg. 1972) Sargent and Wallace (eg. 1976) "money supply surprise" model of the cycle as its centrepiece, it had seemed to have a great deal in common with Friedman's work: hence the "Monetarism Mark 2" label. It attributed economic fluctuations to monetary shocks, denied the existence of a long-run inflation unemployment trade-off, and in ruling out as a theoretical, rather than merely empirical, matter, the effectiveness of discretionary stabilization policy, it affirmed its conservative political links. But crucially, the model's logical structure required that prices move simultaneously with, or even ahead of quantities after a monetary shock, and this was quite contrary to one of the most basic stylised facts of the cycle that Friedman had long stressed.
In the face of the money supply surprise model's inevitable empirical failure, Newclassical economists clung not to their model's monetarist characteristics, but to the marketclearing and rational expectations postulates, the two features that they had added to Friedman's analysis, and took them in a number of directions -into real business cycle theory, monetary models based on Samuelson's over-lapping generations model of money, models of the origins of money, and even into endogenous growth theory. And at the same time, so called "NewKeynesian economics", which emphasises the role of market failures and nominal stickiness in
